

# Typical vulnerabilities in Lightning Apps ⚡

Ололо пыщъ пыщъ

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# Plan

1. Double spends with hold-invoices; anatomy of sendPayment
2. Stealing free fees
3. Race-condition attacks
4. Negative amounts
5. ...
6. Profit!
7. Best practices

# What is a Lapp?


A web app that can interact with the Lightning network:

- Receive payment
- Send payment
- Authenticate (sign with node's key)

# Hold-invoice attack

## Anatomy of SendPayment


1. Create **preimage**
2. **payment\_hash** = hash(preimage)
3. Create **bolt11 invoice** with payment\_hash, amount, description, signature
4. Give **invoice** to Alice
5. Alice sends **HTLC to Bob** protected by payment\_hash promising that Charlie has solution to hash
6. Bob sends **HTLC to Charlie** protected by same hash
7. Charlie **reveals preimage** in order to get the payment



# Hold-invoice attack

```
router.post('/payinvoice', function(req, res) {  
  
  if (userBalance >= num_satoshis) {  
    // got enough balance  
  
    lightning.sendPayment(invoice, function(err, result) {  
      // callback with result of sent payment  
      reduceUserBalance(num_satoshis);  
    });  
  }  
}
```

# Hold-invoice attack. Execution



# Hold-invoice attack. Execution

```
$ # in Ind folder
```

```
$ make tags="invoicesrpc" && make install tags="invoicesrpc"
```

```
$ cat invoices.sh
```

```
PREIMAGE=$(cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc 'a-f0-9' | fold -w 64 | head -n 1)
```

```
HASH=`node -e "console.log(require('crypto').createHash('sha256').update(Buffer.from('$PREIMAGE', 'hex')).digest('hex'))"`
```

```
echo "Incli settleinvoice $PREIMAGE" >> settle.sh
```

```
INV=`Incli addholdinvoice $HASH --expiry 600 --amt 99`
```

```
INV2=`echo $INV | awk '{print $3}' | sed "s/[^a-zA-Z0-9]//g"`
```

```
echo "pre = $PREIMAGE hash = $HASH"
```

```
echo $INV2
```

```
echo $INV2 | qrcode-terminal
```

# Hold-invoice attack. Execution

```
{
  "active": true,
  "remote_pubkey": "03abf6f44c355dec0d5aa155bdbdd6e0c8fefe318eff402de65c6eb2e1be55dc3e",
  "channel_point": "133731f1dc478e8c2942d912241eddd6ea61505d8ecbed3b31d05c4f4faa04b2:1",
  "chan_id": "627920095633539073",
  "capacity": "16777215",
  "local_balance": "3826640",
  "remote_balance": "12941004",
  "commit_fee": "9571",
  "commit_weight": "724",
  "fee_per_kw": "10457",
  "unsettled_balance": "2000",
  "total_satoshis_sent": "42339755",
  "total_satoshis_received": "46166396",
  "num_updates": "4606",
  "pending_htlcs": [
    {
      "incoming": true,
      "amount": "1000",
      "hash_lock": "fNWRrsphomWQPvj+5Dj+PK+RKR0irzb7kRTQoc6Ko/Y=",
      "expiration_height": 590580
    },
    {
      "incoming": true,
      "amount": "1000",
      "hash_lock": "rAZe4wX0HwLZFxb1Uv141XByNPbCeZRh0vI7nacpUBM=",
      "expiration_height": 590580
    }
  ],
  "csv_delay": 144,
  "private": false,
  "initiator": false,
  "chan_status_flags": "ChanStatusDefault"
}
```



# Hold-invoice attack. Protection

- Atomically lock out full withdrawal amount (with fees) before doing anything else
- Lock should not auto-expire. Release lock only when payment is in determined state (either failed or went through)
- Check stuck payments periodically (usually up to ~1day):

*\$ Incl listpayments*

or smth like that

- Disregard invoice expiry

# Stealing free fees

Alice -  
payer 

HTLC



Bob - fees  
666%

1. Offer free withdrawals
2. Someone sets intermediate node with high fees
3. ...
4. Profit!

HTLC



Charlie -  
destination

FEE LIMIT won't help!

# Stealing free fees. Protection

1. Don't giveaway fees:  $\text{feelimit} - \text{lock payment amount} + \text{feelimit}$
2. OR calculate route's fees and add them to amount when charging user

# Probe route example

```
igor@vmi224865:~$ lncli queryroutes --dest=03e2b5fc50b765a9126e027b2220580ce80cd1e81d592746cd581273b06fb6605e --amt=666 | lncli
sendtoroute --payment_hash=ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff -
{
  "payment_error": "UnknownPaymentHash(amt=666000 mSAT)",
  "payment_preimage": "",
  "payment_route": null
}
igor@vmi224865:~$
```

# Race-condition attacks

```
router.post('/payinvoice', function(req, res) {  
  
  if (userBalance >= num_satoshis) {  
    // got enough balance  
  
    lightning.sendPayment(invoice, function(err, result) {  
      // callback with result of sent payment  
      reduceUserBalance(num_satoshis);  
    });  
  }  
  
});
```

# Race-condition attacks. Protection

```
router.post('/payinvoice', function(req, res) {  
  
  if (!(await lock.obtainLock())) {  
    return errorTryAgainLater(res);  
  }  
  
  if (userBalance >= num_satoshis) {  
    // got enough balance  
  
    lightning.sendPayment(invoice, function(err, result) {  
      // callback with result of sent payment  
      reduceUserBalance(num_satoshis);  
    });  
  }  
}
```

# Negative amounts 🤔

```
router.post('/addinvoice', function(req, res) {  
  if (req.body.amt < 0) return errorBadArguments(res);
```

```
  ...
```

```
});
```

# Negative amounts. Protection

Write tests!



# Worth nothing! Other risks

- Unsafe zero-amount invoices
- Unsafely-opened channels
- DDOS to prevent you from issuing retaliate tx
- Observing counterparty offline/online patterns to choose best timing to issue old state tx
- All web-app vulnerabilities apply to you! XSS, injections, fuzzing, etc. Study OWASP!

As LN economy grows, be sure. Black hats will come. Tooling will be made, exploits will be written.

# Best practices

1. Don't store user balance as single variable. It should be a sum of all transactions
2. Don't store amounts as float, only as int. Signed int is ok, no point to enforce unsigned int everywhere
3. RDBMS and Transactional databases are nice to have
4. Log everything, and keep all logs
5. Do regular accounting. At least daily, and investigate if actual values differ from expected
6. Don't be obsessed with MVP

# Acknowledgements

1. Justin Camarena from Bitrefill
2. Andrey Samokhvalov from Bitlum/Zigzag
3. Great guys from <https://ion.radar.tech>

“Not great, just ok”

“Only one coin”

“Just another wallet”



“Could be better”

[i@bluewallet.io](mailto:i@bluewallet.io)

“Meh”

“Some features”



← even Roger is not impressed

